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South-South Cooperation and Neo-Liberal Hegemony in a Post-Aid World. 
 
Behrooz Morvaridi and Caroline Hughes 
 
ABSTRACT 
South-South Cooperation (SSC) has returned as a significant trope in the contemporary 
rhetoric of the aid industry. We compare the way that the idea of SSC is being currently 
constructed. In the 1960s and 1970s, SSC was discussed as constituting a challenge to the 
ideological dominance of the global north, presented initially as a counter-hegemonic 
challenge to neo-colonialism. Currently it is framed similarly as a challenge to neoliberalism. 
However, the current iteration of SSC differs fundamentally from the first round in the early 
1970s, largely because of differences in assumptions about who is co-operating with whom 
and to what end, in the context of SSC. These differences are significant for the material 
practice of SSC and the ideological function of SSC rhetoric. 




South-South Co-operation (SSC) has been an important and contested term in the 
development discourse and the aid industry lexicon since the 1960s. It fell into disuse in the 
1980s but has re-surfaced in the context of the emergence of new donors, in a rhetoric that 
self-consciously reaches back to ideas from the 1970s. The United Nations Office for South- 
South Cooperation defines SSC as: 
a broad framework for collaboration among countries of the South in 
the political, economic, social, cultural, environmental and technical 
domains. … Developing countries share knowledge, skills, expertise 
and resources to meet their development goals through concerted 
efforts (UNOSSC, 2016:2). 
This contemporary understanding of SSC differs significantly from the original political 
implications of the term. SSC rhetoric emerged in the context of 1960s dependency theory. It 
located exploitation at an inter-state level, as something that states and companies in the 
North did to the states and peoples of the South. It presented development as a state-led 
challenge to Northern dominance that was potentially progressive and representative – even 
perhaps ultimately democratic or emancipatory. Because of this, we contend, the initial 
iteration of SSC was specifically politicising. It presented problems of development as 
appropriately addressed through political struggle in line with ideas of justice, sovereignty 
and emancipation. This ideal foundered on the reality of the post-colonial state in the South  
as a contested site which elites were able to dominate, often through violence, derailing the 
prospects for democratic control of capital. The neoliberal turn in the late 1970s and the 
violence of structural adjustment disempowered the state in the South in any case, vis-à-vis a 
constructed ideal of the free market, thereby promoting a depoliticised approach to 
development as a technical agenda (Hout and Robison, 2009). 








Over the past decade, SSC has returned to the international aid agenda alongside Southern 
donors to the aid industry, prompting debate about its continued significance. Some authors, 
not to mention politicians such as Robert Mugabe, regard the return of SSC as a renewed 
challenge to northern donors geopolitical dominance and neoliberal hegemony (Tan-Mullins 
et al, 2010; Quadir, 2013). Traditional donor agencies regard it rather as an opportunity to 
transcend the contestation of past development models in favour of a more genuine consensus 
on the appropriateness of neoliberalization. 
In this article, we argue that contemporary ideas about SSC do not retrieve the radical 
potential of the original formulation, but expand the hegemonic neoliberal world order 
through a reframed idea of North and South. This promotes a new common sense 
understanding of the contemporary international political economy while further 
depoliticising the idea of development. It hijacks the critical force of dependency theory, 
harnessing the terminology of the 1970s and a nostalgia for state-led development to an 
ideological fix that in fact shores up the neoliberal world order in the context of a potentially 
destabilising shift in the functioning of global capital. 
We draw on Robert Cox’s elaboration of the role of power structures and social blocs 
formed around global governance institutions. We understand hegemony in Gramscian terms 
as a “historical-organic ideology” of ruling actors who gain consent for their projects through 
rendering them as common sense or unavoidable. The construction of hegemony is a 
contested process that requires effort, compromises and confrontation with a range of 
context-specific social forces. Where this process is at least partially successful, actors from 
both ruling and subordinate classes come to think of particular modes of production as  
natural and inevitable, and alternatives as extreme or unworkable. Indeed, hegemony operates 
to disguise class divisions themselves, and to present interested strategies of domination as 
public goods, equally beneficial to all. According to Cox, global governance institutions are 
primary mechanisms through which universal norms of a world-hegemony are clearly 




SOUTH – SOUTH COOPERATION AND THE CRISIS OF AID 
The era from the mid-1990s to the present day has seen a crisis of legitimacy for the aid 
industry, in which critiques of development principles and practice have emerged not only 
from the usual critical theorist perspectives but also from the radical right (Easterly, 2014; 
Moyo, 2009) and from industry insiders (Stiglitz, 2002). The rise of the language of 
partnerships, national ownership and participation all represent devices for re-framing 
development, replacing the invisible and often brutal hand of free market fundamentalism 
with a collective process in which aid recipients exercise agency. However, this new agenda 
has also attracted critical commentary, interrogating the power relations that are invoked in 
principle and in practice by a range of processes from village-level participatory budgeting to 
donor harmonization. Critics contended that the aid effectiveness agenda, although altering 
the language and form of donor-recipient relations, has done little to disguise the ongoing and 








inevitable power differential between them (Harrison, 2001; Lie, 2015). Furthermore, donors 
increasingly and explicitly looked to a “selectivity” agenda which merely replaced ex-ante 
conditionality with ex-post (Mosley et al, 2003; Chambas et al, 2004). At the same time, 
extraordinary shifts in capital flows, and geographies of poverty have entailed a need for 
ideological work to produce a new common sense understanding of development and aid to 
protect the privileged status of capital (Eyben and Savage, 2013). In 2011, the High-Level 
Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan broke new ground in articulating the need for a “Global 
Partnership for Development” that directly acknowledged the rise of emerging donors and the 
aid and development activities currently framed as South-South Cooperation. 
Members of the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee have presented the 
emergence of new donors as a prop to neoliberal modes of capitalist development driven by 
the integration of poor economies and populations in globalizing markets for finance and 
commodities. For example, Richard Manning, Chair of the OECD Development Assistance 
Committee, commented in 2006 that “it is entirely logical that we move from a world 
dominated by North-South flows to a much more multi-polar approach where the web of 
cooperation links countries of every sort. The DAC should not aspire to be a donors’ cartel” 
(Manning, 2006). However, he argued that DAC donors should take action to preserve the 
rules by which donors compete. This included insisting on maintaining the agenda set by the 
Millennium Development Goals; untying aid; maintaining international procurement 
standards; and guarding against protectionism. As Manning explained, “the objective should 
remain to maintain a level playing field among donors (ibid.)”: in other words, to preserve the 
rules of the international aid system in a manner that is conducive to neoliberal approaches to 
development. 
Given this approach, where does the idea of South-South Cooperation fit into contemporary 
aid industry dynamics given its radical antecedents? From a Gramscian perspective, we argue 
the Global Partnership and its embrace of SSC represents less a concession to a challenge 
from emerging social forces from below than an ideological shift intended to shore up the 
interests of capital while giving the appearance of a new approach to international 
development. SSC is particularly attractive to DAC donors because it offers ostensibly 
promising solutions to the problem of aid and power in several ways. 
SSC is a phenomenon of emerging powers. It allows traditional donors to take a back seat, 
thus freeing aid-for-development from the politicizing issue of north-south relations more 
widely. At the very least, it can be used to suggest that recipient countries have an alternative 
to the oppressive power of a “harmonized” western liberal donor community. Even where the 
partners are unequal as, say, in the relationship between China and the Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic, with their respective GDPs of US$11 trillion and US$11 billion, the 
ability to play off different donors can be represented as a strengthening of the recipients’ 
hands. The 2010 Bogota Statement on SSC suggests that the increased contribution of 
middle-income countries to SSC is “opening a window of opportunity for all development 
actors to work together towards a more inclusive, effective and horizontal global 
development agenda’ (Bogota Statement, 2010, para 1.d, emphasis added). This precludes the 
kinds of coercive powers associated with structural adjustment in the late 1980s to early 








1990s promising new approaches to aid less overtly connected to North-South domination 
and in which, arguably, recipient countries have to accept complicity by virtue of having 
made a choice to engage. 
Furthermore, the new emerging donors specifically reject the language of aid effectiveness 
that emerged in the “post-conditionality” era. They have substituted a language of 
sovereignty and non-interference for the language of good governance, partnership, and 
national ownership, a move that is attracting increasing interest from the DAC donors 
(Mawdsley, 2015), and offers the prospect of recasting development more believably as an 
equal enterprise between voluntarily contracting parties. This was the goal of the Paris 
Declaration and aid effectiveness agenda, but appears more likely to succeed under the guise 
of South-South solidarity. 
Finally, in using the language of SSC, donors and recipients in the Global South are  
harking back to the radical formulations of dependency theory in the 1960s and 1970s, 
offering opportunities to harness the radicalism of that era as a prop to the legitimacy of new 
aid flows that may actually foster deeper forms of neoliberalisation. The increasing symbiosis 
between emerging and OECD economies and the contemporary modus operandi of emerging 
donors suggest that the new aid environment is unlikely to significantly challenge the basic 
assumptions of neoliberal development. Certainly, the way that SSC is used in contemporary 
policy documents is significantly different, and far less challenging to the dominance of 
globalised capital, from its uses in the early 1970s. 
To demonstrate the contemporary deradicalization of SSC, we analyse a range of primary 
documents produced by landmark development summits among states and inter-state 
development actors in two eras, the 1970s and the 21
st 
century, with particular attention to the 
following questions: how do advocates of SSC in the 1970s and the 2000s respectively 
understand problems of development? What form was SSC supposed to take in the 1970s and 




SOUTH – SOUTH COOPERATION IN THE 1970S 
The framing of “North” and “South” has been fundamental to the history of aid-giving and 
development practice. The idea of the South emerged in the context of anti-colonial liberation 
movements and the geopolitics of the Cold War. Dependency theory provided the intellectual 
underpinnings for this framing of the international political economy, via its account of 
“core-periphery” relations based upon the violent operations of globalizing capital. Gunder 
Frank, for example, suggested that the use of coercion to extract surplus value from the 
periphery through processes of unequal exchange allowed capital accumulation in the centre 
(global north) while producing economic ‘underdevelopment’ and a dependent capitalist in 
the periphery (global south). Thus, ‘the historical mission of capital is to cause 
underdevelopment in the periphery and development in the centre’ (Frank, 1976: 9; also 
Emmanual, 1972). Dependency theory hypothesised that Southern post-colonial economies 
could accomplish independent industrial development only if ties to the centre are severed, or 








the international economic system fundamentally transformed. Self-­­determination and social 
and economic development would only be achieved if the nations in the periphery were in 
an equal relationship with other nation states and not while relations between states were 
based on an unequal exchange of commodities. Crucially, the state in the South was central 
to this change. For neo-Marxist dependency theorists such as Amin, nationalisation of 
peripheral economies represents “the first essential step towards their socialization (Amin, 
2010)” and in the South the “peoples and their States” represent a key political vehicle for 
transforming global economic processes (ibid). 
The transformative potential of states in the South infused the idea of South-South 
Cooperation. The term is commonly traced back to the founding of the Non-Aligned 
Movement at the 1955 Bandung Conference of Asian and African states, that contested the 
Cold War co-optation of post-colonial states into relations of dependency as superpower 
clients. The final communique of the Bandung Conference listed several forms of economic, 
cultural and political cooperation to which newly independent Asian and African countries 
aspired as a means to lessen dependence on superpower patronage. In the economic sphere, 
this meant mutual technical assistance between countries in the South, promotion of intra- 
regional trade, and cooperation to stabilize commodity prices. These aspirations were pursued 
through a range of global and regional institutions. Particularly important were the United 
Nations Conferences on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) held four-yearly from 1964. 
UNCTAD was headed by the economist Raul Prebisch, one of the authors of the Prebisch- 
Singer thesis which proposed the empirical correlation underpinning dependency theory, 
between dependence on primary commodity exports, declining terms of trade and persistent 
development problems. UNCTAD’s agenda was informed by the view that the international 
economic system was structurally unjust and that Northern states routinely exercised power  
to maintain the exploitation of former colonies. 
The G77 was formed at the first UNCTAD conference in 1964, constituting a bloc of states 
who sought to use the UN General Assembly as a forum for contestation between 
diametrically opposed Southern and Northern economic interests. The G77 pursued the call 
for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) through the General Assembly giving rise to 
the Charter on the Economic Rights and Duties in the States in 1974, with the “fundamental 
purpose” of promoting “the establishment of the new international economic order, based on 
equality, sovereign equality, interdependence, common interest and cooperation among all 
states, irrespective of their economic and social systems.” (UN Document, 1974). SSC in the 
fields of economic development and technical transfer were regarded as central drivers of 
necessary “structural changes in the world economy” (Dall-Oglio, 1988: 4). 
Importantly in the Charter were subsequent plans of action including the Kuwait 
Declaration on Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries in 1977, the Buenos 
Aires Plan of Action for Promoting and Implementing Technical Cooperation among 
Developing Countries of 1978, the Caracas Programme of Action on Economic Cooperation 
among Developing Countries of 1981, and the Declaration on the Right to Development 
adopted by the United Nations in 1986. This was the result of many years of international 
campaigns centred on addressing inequalities between states and promoting the social, 
economic  and  political  rights  of  the  self-governing  state.  Despite  the  names  of  these 








declarations, SSC was seen as a specifically political, facilitated by the exercise of power 
through global governance institutions – especially the increased voting power of the 
developing countries in the United Nations. Thus the UN General Assembly  resolution 
calling for the NIEO in 1974 stated: 
 
The developing world has become a powerful factor that makes its 
influence felt in all fields of international activity. These irreversible 
changes in the relationship of forces in the world necessitate  the 
active, full and equal participation of the developing countries in the 
formulation and application of all decisions that concern the 
international community. (UNGA, Dec. 3201, 1974: 2). 
The UN General Assembly passed the Charter despite opposition from the US and other 
industrialised countries, that voted against it on the grounds that it would restrict capital flows 
(Brower and Tepe Jr, 1975: 301). The Charter had no binding force in international law and  
in fact the principles it expressed were contradicted by other on-going multilateral 
negotiations – such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the UN Conference 
on the Law of the Sea – which did lead to binding legal agreements, but based on quite 
different principles than those of the Charter (ibid). 
In the context of the movement for the NIEO, and in the field of technological  and 
economic cooperation, SSC had a rather subversive nature. The G77’s 1981 Caracas 
Programme of Action on Economic Development between Developing Countries 
characterised the global economy as in a state of ‘underlying structural maladjustment and … 
persisting lack of equity in international economic relations” based upon “injustice, 
inequality, exploitation and dependence’ (G77, 1981). This was a state of affairs that required 
a “restructuring” but this was hampered by “the intransigent attitudes adopted by some 
developed countries which have shown a regrettable lack of political will (ibid).” 
The NIEO and the SSC designed to bring it into being were based, then, upon very different 
principles from the neoliberal order which dominated conceptions of development from the 
1980s onwards. The framing ideas of the NIEO and SSC were state sovereignty, economic 
nationalism and state intervention in and regulation of production, consumption and trade. 
State promotion of stable prices and fair trade in primary commodities were central with 
specific reference to the formation of producer cartels for primary commodities, intended to 
mimic the success of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries in the early 1970s. 
Plans for exchanges of information, experts, training and education between different 
countries in the Global South were regarded as facilitating not only the spread of expertise, 
but also political solidarity between Southern states vis-à-vis an exploitative and “neo- 
colonial” set of Northern state and private interests. Thus the Kuwait Declaration on 
Technical Cooperation describes “a conscious, systematic and politically motivated process 
developed to create a framework of multiple links between developing countries” in a context 
of northern domination (Kuwait Declaration, para. 2). A pre-eminent role is awarded to the 
state: “as genuinely representative vehicles of the interests of the peoples of the periphery. 
Locating relations of exploitation at the inter-state level allowed the post-colonial state in the 








South to be painted in a heroic light as the champion of economic liberation and the key to 
modernization and progress (Nandy, 1992:’ 266). 
Clearly, this rhetoric underplayed the extent to which class relations within post-colonial 
states were contested, and the extent to which elites in the Global South were prepared to 
betray the principles of democratic control of resources, monopolising development aid and 
profits from natural resources as political slush funds to shore up particular constituencies of 
support. It also sharply underplays the extent to which elites in the Global South in this era 
actually considered their interests were better served by alliances with the ‘plutocracy of the 
oligopolies of the imperialist triad’, as Amin puts it (2010), than with each other or with their 
own oppressed peoples at home. However, the significant point here is not the extent to 
which the original formulation of SSC offered a workable plan for achieving particular kinds 
of economic restructuring or levels of GDP growth, but the way in which it framed 
development as a contested set of processes in which political power and political struggles 
were decisive in determining distributional outcomes at both the domestic and international 
levels. In so doing, it provided the intellectual basis for political contestation of northern- 
dominated approaches to capitalist development. 
 
 
THE NEO – LIBERAL COUNTER REVOLUTION AND THE NEW SSC 
From the early 1980s onwards, the ability of states in the South to promote the NIEO 
weakened in the face of economic crisis and indebtedness. In this context, neoliberalism 
emerged as an ideological counter-attack on, not only dependency theory, but the whole 
enterprise of development economics (Fine 2005). For neoliberals, the idea of the Global 
South itself represented a self-serving political construct designed to extract foreign aid from 
former colonisers. Leading neoliberal economist Peter Bauer argued that ‘the Third World 
and its antecedents and synonyms … are for practical purposes the collection of countries 
whose governments, with the odd exception, demand and receive official aid from the west’ 
(Bauer 1981, 87). 
Successful incursion by neoliberal global institutions on economic sovereignty in the 
Global South as well as in the former communist world has produced unprecedented 
economic integration in the form of proliferations of complex transnational production 
networks directed by private corporations and the liberalization of controls on the flow of 
capital. Panitch and Gindin, for example, describe the way in which officials in European and 
US financial institutions regarded the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997/8 as ‘an opportunity to 
complete the opening of Asia and other regions to global capital’ (2013: 283). This, they 
argue, increased the pace of capitalist globalization and prompted a massive expansion in 
global financial flows, including to the developing world, where personal credit became 
available to new middle classes for the first time. 
These developments can be regarded as amounting to a new emerging international 
economic order, in the context of rapid growth of particular territories and economic sectors 
in the Global South. However, this is a far different order from that envisaged by dependency 
theorists, characterised by networks of integrated production which have transformed the 








global division of labour, shifting manufacturing jobs from the old Global North to emerging 
economies, even while high-tech research and development and consumption remain 
concentrated in the North. While these trends permit rapid GDP growth in formerly least 
developed countries, they simultaneously cement the dominance of the Global North and 
particularly the US, with manufacturing industries in the South increasingly dependent upon 
US finance and US markets. This consolidation of power entails the entrenchment of certain 
neoliberal assumptions and formations in the apparatus of governance across both North and 
South. 
Intervention in the practices and processes of state building and state regulation of markets is 
increasingly intimately effected by the embedding of international institutions, experts and 
procedures into the fabric of government in the Global South (Harrison, 2001; Hameiri, 
2010). States in the Global South have largely accepted the principles of open markets, free 
trade and convertible currencies and the necessity of policies to attract foreign direct 
investment as a key driver of growth. This represents the successful export of neoliberalism 
outside the old zone of advanced industrialised countries, producing what Panitch and Gindin 
(2013) call an ‘American Empire’. The impact on the emerging economies fundamentally 
challenges the ideological underpinnings of traditional overseas development assistance in 
which industrialised countries supported the primary commodity producing South. However, 
concentration of power in the North remains a central feature of the international political 
economy, thus suggesting the continued salience of conceptions of a ‘North-South divide’. 
 
 
SSC AND AID MODALITY 
In this new order, four key developments have affected the way that the aid context is 
conceptualised and the reappearance of SSC as a new aid modality. First, the shift in 
manufacturing activity from the industrial North to the South has produced a radical change 
in the geography of poverty, such that most poor people now live in middle income countries, 
with profound effects on the imagining of aid as ‘overseas development assistance’. This has 
contributed to the second key development - a shift in the policies of traditional aid donors 
towards what has been termed a ‘post-aid’ approach to development finance (Mawdsley et al 
2014). This links development finance to market access through the provision of services to 
reduce risk and promote market share and reduces funding of traditional development 
programmes, except in conflict-affected and fragile states (HM Treasury and DFID. 2015).   
A third key development is the increased significance of new types of donors, particularly the 
so-called emerging donors (Mawdsley 2012). These actors are commonly portrayed as doing 
aid differently from the traditional DAC donors, distanced from conditionality and post- 
conditionality alike. The significance, particularly, of new emerging donors in global 
governance institutions is a significant aspect of the changing aid environment, as evident in, 
for example, the shift in influence from the G8 to the G20 following the Global Financial 
Crisis of 2008 (Wood 2009) and the emergence of new aid institutions such as the New 
Development Bank and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. 








A final significant feature of the contemporary era is the commodities boom of 2004 to 
2014. 80 per cent of African exports are primary commodities. The decade of the  
‘superboom’ in commodities provided high levels of liquidity for states in poor countries, and 
led to encouraging rates of economic growth in regions such as Sub-Saharan Africa for the 
first time since the early 1970s (African Development Bank 2015, 19). Revenues from the 
commodities boom were at least partially invested in social safety nets that may have helped 
to reduce poverty in such countries, prompting widespread perceptions of an ‘Africa rising’ 
success story along the lines of the Asian miracle (Rowden, 2015) and a positive evaluation  
of the impact of aid from China, which has been closely linked to commodity trade deals. 
However, the high price of commodities has at the same time stifled manufacturing and the 
end of the commodities boom has entailed collapsing growth rates in a number of African 
countries (African Development Bank, 2015: 21; Bailey, 2016; Chonghaile, 2016). 
These trends indicate that the concepts of ‘Global South’, aid recipients, former colonies 
and poverty no longer overlap unproblematically. Robert Zoellick, president of the World 
Bank, claimed in 2010: 
‘If 1989 saw the end of the Second World with communism’s demise then 2009 
saw the end of what was known as the Third World. We are now in a new fast- 
moving multipolar world economy…. where North and South, East and West, are 
now points on a compass not economic destinies’ (Zoellick 2010). 
This raised new hopes that countries of the South could reduce dependence on Northern  
aid. The Declaration on SSC issued at a G77 summit in 2003 stated: ‘economic growth in 
several developing countries and the strengthening of their domestic capabilities can have 
strong impacts on the scope and effectiveness of SSC’ (G77 2003, para. 8). In 2011, in a 
similarly optimistic vein, the UN Secretary General reported the prediction that by 2030, SSC 
will constitute ‘one of the main engines of growth, accounting for 57% of the world’s gross 
domestic product’ (Ban 2011, para 8). The return of SSC in a context of apparent Southern 
success in a neoliberal global economy has raised the question of how far SSC has 
transformed from its original formulation and what role it is intended to perform in the 
contemporary international political economy. 
 
 
THE NEW SSC: WHO COOPERATE WITH WHOM 
The claim that SSC represents a challenge to the hegemony of northern donors has been put 
forward by a range of commentators. At one end of the spectrum, Samir Amin in 2008  
argued that SSC represented a ‘bottom up’ multilateralism and ‘a movement from civil 
society… to provide the grounding for a transformed form of global governance’ (Amin, 
2008: 4). He argues that SSC remains a potent form of political struggle in the contemporary 
era insofar as it promotes delinking the economies of the South from the exploitative system 
of global capitalism. 
More commonly, commentators have focused on the geopolitical challenge represented by 
the rise of the BRICS – Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. Armijo and Roberts 








describe the combination of increasing economic weight and political coordination between 
these emerging powers as constituting ‘the clearest… institutional manifestation of the efforts 
of rising powers to assert themselves in global governance’ (2014: 506), directed at gaining 
increased formal political power within global governance institutions such as the IMF and 
the World Bank, and challenging the dominance of the Global North. The response of the US 
to China’s establishment of the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) would seem to 
support that view. The Bank was set up in 2016 with capital funding of $100 billion, 
specifically to offer an alternative to the Western-dominated World Bank and the Japanese- 
backed Asian Development Bank. Much of the debate over the role of the new bank has 
focused on the potential for China to promote its ‘geopolitical interests’ in competition with 
US.. However, the position of the US has also been criticised as failing to recognise the 
significance of China’s move as a buttress to the neoliberal order, rather than a challenge to  
it. Joseph Stiglitz, for example, argued that US opposition to the new bank represented a 
mistaken concern to maintain US ‘hegemony’, failing to notice that China’s actions in 
establishing the Bank mirror the US’s own embrace of multilateralism in the aftermath of 
World War Two (Stiglitz, 2015). Similarly, Chinese finance minister Lou Jiwei explained 
China’s intention as more international responsibility for the development of the Asian and 
global economies. This stance of upholding rather than undermining the existing order fits 
with Armijo and Roberts’ finding that the BRICS have ‘neither coalesced around the 
developing world’s traditional agenda of redistribution nor developed a radically new 
alternative model for international order’ (2014: 522, emphasis added). 
China’s key concern in financing massive infrastructure projects across Asia via the AIIB is 
to ease its domestic economic imperative of sucking energy and commodities from outside its 
borders into its Southern and South Western manufacturing zones. Thus the AIIB exemplifies 
the way that China - and India, the second largest shareholder - have become promoters of  
the established order. It reflects the pluralization of power in the international system and a 
new way of doing things that is in some respects differs from established aid practices – an 
‘edit’ of the Washington consensus, in Ban and Blyth’s terminology (Ban and Blyth, 2013: 
245) - but this presages an expansion of neoliberal capitalist relations rather than a challenge 
to them. 
Similarly, the Global Partnership Agreement signed at the High Level Forum on Aid in 
Busan in 2011 appears to directly challenge the hegemonic power of northern donors, when it 
states: 
‘We commit to modernise, deepen and broaden our co-operation, 
involving state and non-state actors that wish to shape an agenda that 
has until recently been dominated by a narrower group of 
development actors’ (Busan 2011, para. 7). 
SSC is specifically referenced as a resource for achieving this goal: ‘we welcome the 
opportunities presented by diverse approaches to development co-operation, such as South- 
South co-operation’ (Busan 2011, para. 8). However, comparison of the Busan Global 
Partnership Agreement and other recent documents on SSC - such as the outcome document 
of the Nairobi High Level UN Conference on SSC held in 2003, and the Bogota Plan of 








action formulated in 2010 –– suggests that the transformation of the aid context identified 
above has prompted four key differences in the recent conceptualisation of SSC, with 
implications for the politics of who cooperates with whom and to what end. 
First, ‘triangular cooperation’, or forms of cooperation which incorporate actors from both 
Global South and Global North, are much more significant in the recent era. The formula 
‘SSC and triangular cooperation’ is ubiquitous in documents dated post-2000 and translated 
into the concept of the ‘global partnership’ enshrined in the Busan Global Partnership 
Agreement. An OECD Briefing on the Busan Global Partnership Agreement casts doubt on 
the continuing salience of the categories of North and South in the light of the economic 
crisis: 
‘International co-operation can no longer be understood as simply a 
relationship between “rich” and “poor” governments, but rather it is a 
complex network that includes middle-income countries that are both 
donors and recipients (South-South cooperation), multilateral 
organisations, international financial institutions, and non- 
governmental bodies such as the private sector and civil society 
organisations’ (OECD, 2012). 
Importantly in the Nairobi (2003), Bogota (2010) and Busan (2010) documents, the merits 
of triangular cooperation are framed as emerging from different national comparative 
advantages. This reframes the idea of development as one that no longer represents a 
collective struggle to prise economic justice out of a recalcitrant North. Rather, development 
appears as a technical task to be achieved with maximum efficiency. While the salience of  
the north-south divide is rejected as no longer relevant, traditional donors nevertheless 
smuggle the distinction back into formulations of triangular cooperation through claims about 
distinctive contributions, which constitute a second distinctive feature of contemporary SSC. 
The Global North is presented in recent documents as efficient in providing resources and 
particular expertise, while the Global South provides such advantages as ‘proximity of 
experience’: similar experiences of socio-economic issues arising from problems of late 
development, or regional linguistic or cultural ties that will overcome problems of interaction 
and provide greater potential for ‘capacity development’ (NOD 2003; BSTEID, 2010). 
Documents on SSC produced by traditional donor agencies endorse this approach. DAC 
donors argue that their own comparative advantage, within an ‘SSC and triangular 
cooperation” framework, is “years of knowhow in development assistance’ (OECD, 2009: 9). 
This claim links the Global North to expertise, research and training, thus departing from the 
ambitions of 1970s SSC, cementing the place of the old North in the new global division of 
labour and leaving DAC donors in control of the development process. Emerging donor 
experts, however, come cheaper than DAC donor experts, reducing staffing costs, increasing 
speed and enhancing value for money (OECD. 2009: 8). This delinks problems of 
development from power relations, turning it into a coordination issue and downplaying 
established aid industry hierarchies, rather than challenging them. As a World Bank official 
with experience of China’s SSC programmes in Africa commented approvingly on the 
outcome of the High Level Forum in Busan: 








A key achievement of HLF-4 is that it moves discussion of 
development cooperation modalities away from the dichotomy of 
North-South versus South-South to the recognition of a continuum of 
vertical, horizontal and triangular partnership modalities, with each 
offering positive benefits and opportunities for achieving shared 
objectives.  This is a view that is very much in keeping with the  
World Bank’s vision of the democratization of development (Karp 
2011). 
The South-South side of the triangle ceases to be about efforts by poor countries to 
cooperate in wresting power from former colonial masters and instead represents a 
relationship whereby Northern actors can teach local ones about ways of doing things at one 
remove, via contracted Southern partners, without the terms ‘north’ and ‘south’ needing to be 
mentioned. This removes obstacles raised by the embarrassment of radical inequality in pay 
and conditions and prevents the colonial master-servant binary inconveniently imposing itself 
as a metaphor on the situation, giving rise to local intransigence and ill-will (Hughes, 2011). 
Traditional donors’ reservation of authoritative knowhow for themselves is contested by 
emerging donors, who argue their recent experience of development is more relevant to 
Southern recipients and therefore their own expertise is more pertinent. Both India and China 
have invested heavily in training and education programmes. This includes the growth of the 
Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation Programme, originally established in 1964 and 
recently expanded in line with India’s rapidly growing investment and trade particularly with 
Africa. The programme’s purpose is presented as allowing poorer countries ‘to share in the 
Indian developmental experience acquired over six decades of India's existence as a free 
nation’. The return on this for India is ‘a visible and growing awareness among other 
countries about the competence of India as a provider of technical know-how and expertise as 
well as training opportunities, consultancy services and feasibility studies’ as well as 
‘immense goodwill and substantive cooperation among the developing countries’ 
(Government of India, 2015). 
Similarly, China’s International Poverty Reduction Centre, established jointly with UNDP, 
is regarded by the Chinese Government as a key plank of China’s SSC programme, and its 
delegations to various countries in Asia, Africa and the Pacific foreground China’s ‘success’ 
in reducing poverty at home as a potential opportunity for learning for China’s poor 
neighbours. This is similar to the Nairobi Outcome Document’s framing of development as 
‘the need to enhance local capacity in developing countries by supporting local capabilities, 
institutions, expertise and human resources and national systems, where appropriate, in 
contribution to national development priorities at the request of developing countries’ (NOD: 
para 13). 
This claim apparently resonates with the original premise of SSC. The 1978 Buenos Aires 
Plan of Action on Technical Cooperation, for example, stated that exchanges of technical 
knowledge between developing countries allows them to: 








‘… create, acquire, adapt, transfer and pool knowledge and  
experience for their mutual benefit and for achieving social and 
economic self-reliance which are essential for their social and 
economic development’ (BAPA, 1978: para. 5). 
Original SSC formulations emphasised underdevelopment not only as arising from lack of 
knowhow but also from active exploitation.  The BAPA emphasises that ‘building capacity’  
is a ‘dimension’ of ‘the developing world’s determination to achieve national and collective 
self-reliance’ (BAPA, para. 12) aimed at enabling developing countries ‘to attain a greater 
degree of participation in international economic activities and to expand international 
cooperation’ (BAPA, para. 15). 
A third issue in contemporary SSC is the foregrounding of the importance of transparency 
and coordination, which has largely displaced the nurturing of solidarity as a key principle of 
South-South relations. For example, both the Nairobi Outcome Document and the Bogota 
Statement emphasise the need to enhance ‘mutual accountability and transparency’. The 
Bogota statement suggests that Southern Donors should learn from the aid effectiveness 
agenda’s evidence-based approach. Similarly, in the Busan Partnership for Effective 
Development Cooperation (2012), emphasises Mutual accountability and more importantly 
accountability to civil society. This is regarded as a prerequisite to ‘deepen, extend and 
operationalise the democratic ownership of development policies and processes’ (para 12). 
Arguably, however, the basis envisaged for democratic ownership here is a slender one, and 
the apparent advance on earlier formulations of SSC is therefore something of a mirage.  
Early formulations of SSC were reticent on the subject of democracy. The word democracy 
does not appear at all in the Buenos Aires Plan of Action of 1978, for perhaps obvious 
reasons. Clearly, this falls a long way short of an emancipatory project, or even a democratic 
one, envisaging politics as a top-down process of calling into being a unified public 
supporting the state in its anti-imperialist struggle for economic power. This resonates with 
the nation-building rhetoric of the era, which incorporated not only sporadic attempts to 
promote modernization, democratization and welfare but also programmes of cultural 
homogenisation and authoritarian mobilization involving widespread and devastating 
bloodshed. The formulations in Nairobi, Bogota and Busan do not substitute specifically 
democratic approaches to representative politics; rather they invoke thin forms of “multi- 
stakeholder” consultation through transparency and accountability as advocated, for example, 
in the World Bank’s approach to social accountability (World Bank, 2004). The key features 
of this approach are its consumer orientation, focused on individuals making rights-based 
claims, rather than collective action in pursuit of a common interest. The public are not 
mobilized politically but are offered the opportunity to monitor outcomes, particularly as 
these affect them individually. The aim is not a political redistribution of resources based 
upon ideas of justice, as might be expected of a democratic approach, but a market 
reallocation of resources based upon ideas of efficiency. In neo-liberal formulations, 
accountability and transparency ensure that the preferences of all stakeholders are fully 
elaborated in the interests of optimally efficient resource distribution: as the Nairobi Outcome 








Document (2003) puts it, ‘the impact of SSC should be assessed with a view to improving, as 
appropriate, its quality in a results-oriented manner’. 
The final and perhaps most obvious significant difference between the two eras of SSC is the 
contemporary emphasis on the integration of supply chains, directly contradicting the former 
aspiration for national economies under popular control. In the Global Partnership 
Agreement, the nature of development itself is defined as GDP growth facilitated by a 
‘framework’ through which ‘developing countries increasingly integrate, both regionally and 
globally, creating economies of scale that will help them better compete in the global 
economy’ (Busan, 2011, para.28). This precludes democratic debate of the dependency thesis 
itself, as well as limiting the scope for states to operate interventionist industrial policies. 
Although trade was a key concern of the NIEO, 1970s discussions focused on promoting 
the autonomous development of countries in the South, in particular through technological 
upgrading that could end dependence on primary commodity exports manufactured imports. 
The decentring of manufacturing away from the Global North and the emergence of global 
supply chains as integral to the international economy has disturbed the geographical 
coherence of the core-periphery model. China’s relationships with its suppliers of raw 
materials are a significant aspect of its aid activities and its interest in SSC is clearly linked to 
the need to import commodities. China’s relationship with its South East Asia neighbours of 
Myanmar, the Lao Democratic Republic and Cambodia, for example, are to a great extent 
driven by China’s demands for energy from hydropower projects on the lower Mekong, 
offshore oil and gas exploration and the pipelines linking these to South West China.. 
At the same time, suppliers of raw materials to China’s manufacturing industries find 
themselves flooded with Chinese goods in return, precluding their own industrial 
development and trapping them in primary commodity production. Ethiopian prime minister 
Meles Zenawi commented at a three-day China-Africa summit in 2006 that 90 per cent of 
manufactured goods in Addis Ababa were Chinese-made and added: ‘There are people who 
say the flood of Chinese goods will undermine Africa's national industry, but I don't think  
this is a problem. If you can't compete with the global market, you have to get it from the 
global market. There is no alternative’ (Watts, 2006). Yet this more closely resembles the 
classic neo-colonial North-South relationships described by dependency theorists than the 
solidarity relationships envisaged by early 1970s SSC. 
The attractiveness of this kind of relationship in 2006 was arguably predicated on the 
temporary high price of primary commodities rather than on any particular solidarity  
manifest in Chinese business dealings. The fall in commodity prices since 2014 has produced 
a significant slow-down in GDP growth across a range of resource-dependent economies in 
Africa, revealing the continued vulnerability of African economies (Bailey, 2016). The 
building of supply chains linking raw materials from across the world to manufacturing 
concentrations in China, India and elsewhere that supply markets in the Global North 
represents the promotion of the interests of globalised capital over the interests of territorially 
based communities. Even though new kinds of public-private partnership or state-owned 
enterprises may be implementing these projects in practice, through deals with state actors, 
this amounts to renewed harnessing of the force of the state to the workings of the market 












SSC AND THE STATE 
These four areas of difference suggest that current SSC represents an extension of 
neoliberalism rather than a genuine alternative to it, and that it operates ideologically to recall 
the radical potential of the original formulation while at the same time denying the relevance 
of the North-South dichotomy and promoting a depoliticised and disempowering approach to 
development. Underlying this shift is the transformation of the assumed nature of the state 
from a representative repository of active sovereignty over economic resources to a 
‘competition’ or ‘regulatory’ state (Cerny, 1997; Jayasuriya, 2005). Jayasuriya argues that 
processes of neoliberal reform in Asia have created a new model of statehood which “shifts 
the function of the state from the direct allocation of social and material goods and resources 
to the provision of regulatory frameworks within the economic order’ (2006: 384). Such 
states have retreated from ideas of sovereignty over resources in favour of neo-liberal models 
privileging market allocations of resources as more efficient and therefore better. The 
regulatory state thus refrains from developing political agendas focused on the material 
interests of citizens, and instead retreats into a technical agenda of market regulation. Of 
course, the reality of many post-colonial states in the 1970s was quite different from this 
democratic ideal. It prominently featured widespread predation and rentierism in which elites 
aligned with foreign and domestic capital to strip assets in a form of primitive accumulation 
in order to generate slush funds for shoring up political dominance. However, the belief that 
the state was at least potentially reclaimable as a vehicle through which the peoples of the 
Global South could exercise sovereignty over their national economies was a mobilizing  
ideal integral to the call for a NEIO and encouraging the centrality of political struggle to the 
question of development. 
The NIEO was premised on the belief that a large part of the problem of  predatory 
statehood was the role of northern capital and transnational corporations in seducing southern 
political elites away from their representative function. Current formulations of SSC, by 
contrast, now regard alliances between states and international capital as positive drivers of 
development. The role of states in the South is not to contest with businesses for control of 
resources, but to ally with them in a way that respects formal sovereignty while integrating 
supply chains through facilitating the deterritorialised flow of resources and finance. The 
Nairobi Outcome Document (2003) defines South-South Cooperation in terms of ‘regional 
integration initiatives across the developing world, seen in, among other things, the creation 
of regional common markets, customs unions, cooperation in political fields, institutional and 
regulatory frameworks, and inter-State transport and communications networks’. This 
represents cooperation to promote the neoliberal development model, not cooperation to 
challenge it, and thereby supports the argument that emerging donors are buttressing the 
international neoliberal order through engaging in a new distribution of the work of 
constructing hegemony. 








SSC is significant not only because of the material practices that it embraces, but also 
because of the utility of the language of SSC in legitimising this enterprise. The language of 
SSC invokes the earlier aspiration for states that stand for properly representative politics 
even while implementing a set of practices that encourage the integration of states into global 
supply chains by tying current and future natural resource exploitation into trade relationships 
that mirror colonial patterns. The emphasis of new emerging donors on state sovereignty 
appears to hark back to the NIEO agenda, but the models of development implicit in current 
forms of SSC have nothing to do with an agenda of state-led industrialization. Rather they 
reflect standard neo-liberal practices of global integration, international investment and 
export-led development strategies. 
The modalities of SSC implemented by emerging donors blurs the dividing line between 
state and capital, reflecting Glassman’s account of neoliberalism as ‘a class practice of the 
most powerful, geographically mobile capitalists’, in which the state is not simply ‘rolled 
back’ but mobilized selectively and opportunistically in a range of strategies, including some 
(such as nationalization of banks following financial crises) that have traditionally been seen 
as antithetical to a neoliberal approach (Glassman, 2007: 96). New forms of economic 
cooperation in the context of SSC make the relationship between state and capital opaque, 
thereby making efforts at popular sovereignty problematic. The obvious example of this is  
the complex relationship between aid and investment by Chinese state-owned investment 
banks. These entities defy the divide between state and market, leading some authors to 
regard the challenge of the BRICS as representing the return of state-led development. 
However, as Ban and Blyth suggest, the ways in which the BRICS ‘attempted to balance their 
adoption of select parts of the Post-Washington Consensus while defending and often 
reinventing the relevance of state-led development policies under the guise of being 
compliant with the Washington Consensus itself’ (Ban and Blyth, 2013: 20) can also be read 
as a sign of the adaptability and durability of neoliberal approaches. 
The relationship between the state and the market as embodied in, for example, Chinese 
state-owned enterprises is highly complex. In 2012, 80 per cent of the value of the Chinese 
stock market comprised national or state-owned firms (Wooldridge, 2012) but there is a high 
degree of variation between sectors, provinces and enterprises as to what this means. Efforts 
to reform state-owned enterprises have relied upon restructuring the companies so that they 
more closely resemble private sector organisations, while maintaining tight state - and more 
specifically Communist Party - control (Wei, 2015). This has produced a situation in which 
the distinction between state and non-state parts of the economy, and old distinctions between 
state owned enterprises and private companies, has become ‘blurred’ (Hassard et al, 2010: 
511). Equally, new approaches, including “national champions” – private firms that are 
fostered through close relationships with the state (Woodridge, 2012) - and innovative forms 
of public-private partnerships (FT Confidential, 2016) represent new forms of economic 
entity that combine state power with the expansion of financialisation in new ways. These are 
pioneering new approaches to development assistance that significantly disrupt the typologies 
implicit in DAC definitions, and in the years following the Global Financial Crisis of 2008, 
attracted approval from stalwart supporters of neoliberalism. The Economist, for example, 
reported in 2012 that the success of new forms of state capitalism reflected the greater power 








and sophistication of the modern state, which, it suggested, is ‘far better at using capitalist 
tools to achieve its desired ends’ (Wooldridge, 2012). The new state capitalism, “instead of 
handing industries to bureaucrats or cronies…, turns them into companies run by professional 
managers’ (ibid). 
The implications of this for the politics of development are profound. Although this is to 
some extent a state-led development effort, it lacks any kind of link to democratic control. In 
the rhetoric of contemporary SSC, the foregrounding of state sovereignty is not a  
precondition for democratic control of development trajectories but a substitution for it. This 
links the idea of the state as potentially wresting control of resource distribution in the 
interests of the world’s poor with the practice of state facilitation of greater international 
flows of capital and resources between and within South and North. The wedding of these 
two contradictory approaches to development has been relatively successful in the context of 
high commodity prices awarding windfall profits that can fund populist policies and keep a 
lid on conflict in a context of increasing inequality within nations, but the end of the 
commodities boom and the slow-down of growth in the emerging powers may presage a 




Comparison of the rhetoric of South-South Cooperation in the 21
st 
century, as opposed to the 
earlier iteration in the 1970s, reveals a distinct shift in the ideological underpinnings of the 
practice. SSC in the early 1970s was regarded as solidarity action amongst subaltern actors to 
challenge their domination by Northern economic actors, including not only Northern states, 
but Northern-based firms and Northern-dominated international organisations. SSC thus 
represented a political alliance intended to exercise power on a global stage and force the 
reform of an international economic order regarded as fundamentally unjust. In the context of 
this collaboration, the state in the South was regarded –idealistically and despite the obvious 
reality of predatory practices by state elites – as the repository not only of economic 
sovereignty over natural resources but also of the political aspirations of the  oppressed 
peoples of the formerly colonized world. SSC was not merely a compact between states but 
between oppressed peoples of various nations. The contemporary usage of the term, as 
explicated in the documents examined above, is quite different, and reflects a neo-liberal 
framing of development problems as technical matters that can be resolved through 
appropriate strategies of domestic reform and capacity building combined with embrace of 
liberal property rights and free trade. The role of the state is specifically apolitical, focused 
upon regulation rather than redistribution or administration, with the key objective being the 
fostering of growth through efficient allocation of resources in order to meet human 
development goals. The exercise of political power in the interest of justice no  longer 
features. 
The pre-eminent place of the emerging economies – particularly China – in the 
revitalization of South-South Cooperation has been regarded as threatening to traditional 
northern  donors  and  the  neoliberal  consensus.  However,  the  ideological  hegemony  of 








neoliberal ideas facilitating the globalization of capital has arguably been well-served by the 
activities of the emerging economies in aid and development in low-income South East Asia 
and Sub-Saharan Africa. The outsourcing of traditional forms of technical development 
assistance from DAC countries to emerging economies assists in the drive to depoliticization 
inherent in neoliberal development strategies, since it obscures the rich-poor, North-South, 
centre-periphery categories of dependency theory which remained problematic for the 
legitimacy of the aid enterprise throughout the postcolonial era. At the same time, emerging 
donors have rapidly promoted greater integration of economies across the Global South into 
the global economy courtesy of Chinese and Indian investment banks, infrastructure projects 
and mineral companies, and other ingredients of the 2003 to 2014 commodities super cycle. 
They have done so in a way that has brought a new degree of flexibility into neo-liberal 
orthodoxy, which has assisted in propping up capitalist relations in the aftermath of the 
economic devastation of the Global Financial Crisis. Now that commodities prices  are 
falling, however, it is questionable whether this form of South-South Cooperation will 
continue to appear as attractive as formerly to either emerging economies or their less 
fortunate partners. 
The new rhetoric of South-South Cooperation awards a regulatory, rather than a  
specifically political, role for the state, if the former is regarded as entailing the deployment 
of power in the interest of neo-liberal market formation, rather than to determine who gets 
what, when and how. This is counter-intuitive given the continued heavy dependence upon 
state capitalism of three of the BRICS countries, China, Russia and Brazil. However, since 
the 2008 Global Financial Crisis the relationship between states and markets in neo-liberal 
orthodoxy has altered significantly, with states playing a more complex interventionary role 
in economic affairs, but in the interests of shoring up global capital rather than distributing 
welfare to workers. In this context, the strategies of emerging powers are less of a challenge 
to OECD-DAC-promoted models of development practice than an expansion and elaboration 
of them in a rapidly transforming global economy. Yet the state remains a contested site, and 
as state revenues decline, particularly in primary commodity producers, new political 
mobilizations to re-assert a redistributive agenda may be back on the cards in the Global 
South raising the question of whether the forms of cooperation explicit in current approaches 
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